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"Individuality," John Dewey wrote in Individualism Old and New (1962), 
"is at first spontaneous and unshaped, it is a potentiality, a capacity of 
development." (p. 168) The form individualism takes is dependent on 
preexisting patterns of behavior and habits of mind that characterize the 
society into which one is born. For Dewey, individuality reflects a community 
orientation; it is not merely self-shaping or autonomous: 
The argument that individuality is shaped and formed only through 
interaction with actual conditions' could be substantiated by 
considering the influence of membership in a language community on 
thought and disposition, the social nature of experience, and the 
stake that everyobody has in solving the ongoing problems that 
threaten the well-being of the larger community. (Bowers, 1987, 
on Dewey, p. 35) 
Dewey challenged the idea of an autonomous individual by highlighting its 
erroneous implications for the nature of (individual) freedom. He transformed 
the problem of individual freedom from one of.alternative mechanisms for 
escaping social control (in order to exercise greater inner self-direction, be 
a self-determining individual) into one concerned with the acquisition of a 
form of power that involves an increased capacity to reorganize experience. 
The recognition of the social nature of the individual led to an appreciation 
of the need for understanding how the fostering of interdependence increases 
the effective power of individuals. 
Another giant of twentieth-century education Paulo Friere, has also 
maintained a crucial focus on individual empowerment through a (critical) 
reorganization of experience, and the fundamental importance of the social: 
Men [sic] ... because they are aware of themselves and thus of the 
world--because they are consciou beinus--exist in a dialectical 
relationship between the determination of limits and their own 
freedom. As they separate themselves (through critical 
reflection) from the world, which they objectify, as they separate 
themselves from their own activity, as they locate the seat of . 
their decisions in themselves and in their relations with the 
world and others, men [sic] overcome the situations which limit 
them...As critical perception is embodied in action, a climate of 
hope and confidence develops which leads men [sic] to attempt to 
overcome the limit-situation. (Friere, 1971, p. 89) 
Because Dewey and Friere have each had a tremendous impact on 
contemporary educational discourse, they are particularly good illustrations 
of how this discourse has problematically maintained liberal philosophical 
separations between the individual (or unitary subject) and society (culture, 
social structure, etc.), even though they themselves are critics of 
traditional liberalism. In effect, liberal visions reflect their own failure 
to adequately grasp that individualism, emancipation, and change--the 
prominent liberal source of empowerment--are metaphors which themselves mirror 
earlier conventions of thought that segmented reality into distinct entities 
abstracted from context. As Bowers (1987) expresses it, focusing on the 
empowerment of the individual, and hence inadequately addressing the ways in 
which and individual is embedded in tradition, results in a distorted view of 
an individual's power of origination, and of the emancipatory potential of the 
rational process: 
A fuller understanding of the nature of tradition, as well as the 
complexity of the individual's embeddedness, would have perhaps 
led to a more qualified interpretation of education as an 
emancipatory activity and to greater sensitivity toward those 
traditions that education should help to preserve. (p. 51) 
The persistence of the individual/society dualism has made it virtually 
impossible to fathom education without resorting to purely social analyses 
that neglect individual agency, or to purely localized notions of individual 
subjects that preclude reasonable recognition of the roles of cultural, 
social, historical, and/or material forces. In what seem to be parallel 
discourses, we have, on the one hand, Antonio Gramsci's (1971) realization 
that "every relationship is an eduational relationship." (In order to receive 
the passive or active assent of the general population, he adds, nations, 
dominant classes and ruling groups must generate a 'common sense' that is 
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broadly disseminated in everyday life or private life, as distinct from 
economic or political life.) While, on the one hand, we can phrase the task 
of education, as did Martin Buber (1948), as entailing the very question of 
social change through the individual: each child is born with the impress of 
history stamped upon it by the heritage of past generations; and each child is 
the potential begetter of unborn generations, having an indisputable portion 
in the act of Creation itself. Indeed, each child is a latent source of 
renewal. (Buber argues that the problem faced by education concerns the means 
by which the power to generate the new can itself be renewed.) 
That is, we tend to understand statements like those above in standard 
dualistic ways, especially when we hear only pieces of the authors' work taken 
out of context. This tendency has led notable historians of education to 
intepret its intellectual history as the question of "the individual, society 
and education" (e.g., Karier, 1986) while philosophers of education begin 
required courses for doctoral students with the provocative rhetorical 
question, "should/can/does education lead society, or should/can/does society 
lead education?" followed by an examination of the (liberal) paradox of equity 
for all (as a social distribution issue) versus the excellence of individuals. 
Actually, this is not surprising. Education as a discipline in the 
twentieth century has been virtually identified with psychology, and 
psychology itself has unfortunately had the propensity to collapse 
subjectivity into the notion of the individual. (Henriques d., 1984) 
However, recent methodological critiques and conceptual repair of individual 
and social psychology discuss the meaning and role of psychology without 
performing the necessary analyses of the immediate socially organized 
production, and the explanatory insufficiency of its conceptual products: 
In this limited self-diagnosis ...p sychology repeats its 
characteristic mode of thought: a dissociation of mind from 
historically patterned social relations and an insistence on the 
explanatory priority of th most visible surface immediacies. It 
avoids what is less evident, but causally more potent--the 
organization of a collective social life. (Wexler, 1983, p. xv) 
We need to view educative experiences in ways that allow the recognition 
that they are always not only produced, but also regulated and legitimated. 
Moreover, such production must be understood as constructed within the social 
forms that regulate and limit both what people are and can be. (Simon, 1987) 
This notion implicitly acknowledges the theoretical centrality of power, and 
stresses that power must be appreciated not as a property that can be traded 
for liberty, but as a feature of a relationship. Power does not act directly 
and immediately on people; rather, it acts on their actions, working through 
discursive and material practices that, in the moment of concretization, 
already delimit and condition action. (Foucault, 1983) 
It.may initially be difficult for many in education, raised on a diet of 
classical liberal thought, from Plato through Rousseau to Dewey and beyond, to 
accept the theoretical power of "power." Our notions of the "power 
perspective" are built on the arguments of Thrasymachus in Plato's Rewublic, 
who articulated the canonical representation of power as a scarce resource. 
He declared that the strong, the rulers, decide the norms of how people 
behave; they even determine the content of "justice," even if its form in the 
abstract is "doing the good of another." (Lycos, 1987) The epistemic 
advantage of this point of view is exemplified by the tyrant. Only someone 
capable of fully adopting the perspective of power in his or her life can see 
clearly how concepts like justice actually serve the powerful. Only they can 
assess precisely how people's actions "justly" motivated turn them into 
obedient servants, that is, people who can be relied on to do the advantage of 
the stronger because they consistently neglect their own interests and remain 
blind to the true effects of their actions. Plato's point, toward which he so 
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carefully manipulated this section of his dialogue, was that such an attitude 
was a symptom of the deterioration of the Athenian democracy. He feared, as a 
more current polemicist echoed in The Closins of the American Mind (Bloom, 
19871, that many of his contemporaries really thought this way about life and 
conduct in the w. He wanted to convert people to another way of talking 
aobut justice, which conceived of the concept as a central feature of moral 
excellence.of the individual. 
Thrasymachus represented one possible denial of the separation of moral 
authority from political hegemony. But Plato likely thought that the failure 
to distinguish between moral authority and political supremacy was precisely 
. - 
the essence of tyranny. Hence, his argument lends credence to mainstream 
*. . . 6.  . 
American discourse based on Puritan notions of self-government and individual 
self-control developed through the cultivation of rationality. (Kaestle, 1983) 
The Re~ublic tried to show that it is only when power is seen as flowing from. 
knowledge--reason, as Plato understood it--that the desire for it will 
incorporate the desire for virtue and justice. Centuries later, many of us 
are still convinced that it is only under this condition that it would be 
"natural" to entrust the fulfillment of desire for virtue and justice to the 
desire for power, whereas under traditional political arrangements this seems 
ludicrous. Thrasymachus did mistakenly confine the desire for power to 
"pleonexia," that is, to the want of "more than others." His belief that the 
value of mastery, control and freedom is obtained through such a desire has 
notable weaknesses. But his is not the only conceptualization of power 
available to us. Foucault (1979, 1983) turns Thrasymachus' "economics of 
power" (power as exchange value) into a "physics of power" in which power is 
understood as a force which works through the actions of people in such a way 
that it structures the field of possible actions of the actor and others. 
This conception of power effectively decenters the indivudal and vastly 
increases the. importance of the question of the origin and nature of 
relationships among "individuals." 
Thus, to employ a dangerous metaphor which I suspect we will have to 
abandon, we need to "free ourselves of our desire" for a unitary subjectivity. 
This we must do in favor of theorizations that are prepared to accept the 
subject's "[division' both by the repression of that which cannot and refuses 
to be expressed and [by] the constant processes of reorganization that 
construct a fragmented, contradictory consciousness." (Simon, 1987, p. 157) 
Subjectivity includes both conceptually-organized, articulated knowledge and 
elements that move us without being consciously expressed: 
These elements include both pre-conscious taken-for-granted 
knowledge and the radical and sedimented needs and desires that 
are expressed in our demands on ourselves and others. As an 
active ongoing construction, subjectivity is always a material and 
discursive rendering of these forms of knowledge .... In its 
manifestations in practice, subjectivity expresses a non-unitary 
social identity accomplished through the historically produced 
social forms through which people live. Hence, subjectivity 
reflects both objective conditions and a socially constructed 
representation of everyday life. (Simon, 1987, p. 157) 
This is easier said than done. Our research questions, coming as they 
do out of our own subjectivities, and formed in part by the strong legacy of 
liberal discourse (Gintis, 1980), do not always comply with the theorized 
requirements outlined above. Reflecting divergences from them, what I will do 
in this paper is begin with two inchoate pedagogical dilemmas, and reflect on 
their refinement. As will be shown, what they have in common is their 
articulation of the need for links between the problem of empowerment and the 
need for a culture held in ecological balance. 
The first dilemma is concerned with responsibility for the use of one's 
knowledge, interpreted as the authority of knowledge across time. In its most 
global conception, the pedagogical dilemma has to do with social recognition 
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of the long-term implications and ramifications of our actions. Continual 
creation and haphazard dumping of toxic waste, and upscaled and irreversable 
destruction of tropical rain forests, are symptoms of difficulties ordinarily 
inherent in even the most effective mass educative movements. In its more 
localized conception, the dilemma addresses the fragility of individual 
autonomy and authority ever present in efforts to cultivate responsible 
agents. The traditional confusion on this matter arises out of problematic 
pedagogical moments such as that in the split second before a three-year-old 
reaches out to touch a hot stove. We can imagine a reasonable discussion of 
how to handle this situation, with arguments that range from "a kid'll never 
get burned twice" to "never ever let a kid get near a stove, and you'll never 
have to assert external authority from above and disengage the kid's own 
rational decision-making." People tend to sit somewhere between these two 
extremes, depending on whether they believe, like the early American Puritans, 
that children are naturally evil and need to have the devil whipped out of 
them, or whether they believe, like Rousseau, that children are naturally 
good, merely corrupted by the evils of society. But the discussion becomes 
radically skewed when the situation becomes a young child about to plunge into 
a highly toxic river on a hot, sunny day or, a teenager conscientiously 
working on what will be a severe case of skin cancer within a decade while 
developing a perfect tan. And the confusion increases as people introduce 
situations where adults are "by right" left to choose whether or not the pay 
for working in a Hormel factory or a nuclear power plant is worth the risk of 
a machine slicing of digits or limbs, or the expectation of serious cancer and 
future mutant progeny. Finally, the dilemma is best revealed by instances in 
which individual actions (e.g., using disposable diapers or making nuclear or 
chemical weapons) actually destroy the probability of others' lives, in which 
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actions are removed form their biological embeddedness within the place in 
which they occur. 
The second dilemma, very much overlapping the first, arises out of 
teachers' reflections on the degree to which their own actions do not in any 
way serve the interests of their students. Much of what we do as teachers is 
done to make us feel better, or for our own benefit. Upon reflection, we 
become increasingly horrified by actions of our students that can only be 
directed at the teacher's needs. We recoil as they nod their heads in a 
promise that they are listening. And we fall back in disgust as they beg to 
understand what is expected of them. Claims that the pupils themselves should 
determine how their needs can best be met by a course are often viewed as an 
even more insipid form of restriction in which their efforts will be judged by 
secret instead of overt criteria. They believe that the teacher knows in 
advance what is best, and so they resent it when a progressive facilitator of 
learning seemingly withdraws from the responsibility of telling them what this 
is. Furthermore, attempts to include forms and types of knowledge that 
conflict with those that studetns have been taught to expect may serve only to 
delegitimate these forms and types as contrasted with "real" knowledge. 
The assumption underlying both dilemmas is that the individual, freed 
from coercion, will naturally choose freedom, democaracy and other forms of 
"correct" thinking. Focusing on the individual in such a way came into its 
own, according to Valerie Walkerdine (19831, in the period after World War I, 
when setting children free was seen as a political and moral imperative. 
German militarism was taken to be founded in "discipline" and the "grotesque 
tragedy of German subserviency." If German education had been an instrument 
that ingrained such notions in the soul of an entire people, then an 
individualism founded in child-centeredness appeared to offer a democratic 
alternative. An education based on freedom would produce the democratic, free 
individual--free not only from fascism but from the threat of any political 
totalitarianism or extremism as well: 
In the name of those who have died for the freedom of Europe, let 
us go forward to claim for this land'of ours that spread of true 
education which shall be the chief guarantee of the freedom for 
our children forever. (paraphrased British educational lierature, 
Walkerdine, 1983) 
We need to leave behind a simple, dichotomous view of a liberatory 
pedagogy which frees the individual, on the one hand, and a repressive one 
which contains and stifles freedom and individuality, on the other. What we 
might reflect on instead is that set of assumptions which is shared by the 
considerable range of positions in which the nature of the individual (child) 
is unquestioningly taken to be the natural starting-point for thinking about 
education. (Walkerdine, 1983) The charisma of "the nature of the child" as 
the only sound basis for educational decisions--at least for decisions made in 
the classroom, outside ,and beyond the trappings of political parties and 
ideologies--is due to its status as incontrovertible fact. Indeed, the 
defense of progressive education and child-centeredness against the backlash 
of the conservative restoration (Shor, 1986) has used that individually formed 
nature in arguments that "the other side" is wrong about children and 
learning. Unfortunately, this has meant that it has been politically 
difficult to raise questions about that' nature which do not seem to collapse 
back into agreement with traditional pedagogy. When we speak about individual 
freedom in education, we need to reflect on the meaning of "freedom for our 
children forever" and to rethink what "the individual" who makes his or her 
choices actually is: 
The modern, bourgeois individual is not a natural being, which can 
be cultivated in freedom or stifled in regimentation. It is a 
particular historical product, brought into being by those modern 
forms of social organization which procliam it to be natural and 
normal. (Walkerdine, 1983, p. 81) 
That is, modern eduational ideas about the normal are not self-evident but are 
linked to a particular "brand" of psychological explanation: 
The psychological theories and practice become mutally confirming. 
Let us take one of the most important propositions--that reasoning 
is a natural process which children develop in a particular 
sequence of stages. In relation to this idea, teachers have 
developed formal and informal techniques for observing children's 
development, assessing their "readiness" for particular materials 
and topics, and for judging whether learning has actually taken 
place. But as what they are looking for, as well as the evidences 
and theories, their own evidence is either bound to confirm it or 
be explained by recourse to some other explanation within child- 
centredness. It would be difficult for a teacher to step outside 
the very assumptions which made her or his practice possible at 
all. (Walkerdine, 1983, p. 81) 
Again, what seems to be the origin of pedagogy--the nature of the child--is 
actually the outcome of the everyday techniques and practices of teachers. 
For many teachers interested in social change, child-centered 
progressivism seems to be the basis of a revolutionary promise. The teacher's 
job, central to the struggle for liberation, is to scorn stifling norms, 
grades, and labels, in favor of developing a revolutionary consciouness; 
escheewing group class lessons, such teachers can allow children to be 
individuals in their own right. The aim of such practices is to help children 
throw off the chains of society and to discover their true selves. But of 
course that "true" self possesses certain characteristics that are assumed to 
be naturally given, yet are actually historically produced through pedagogic 
practices: 
The alternative is not between a schooling which represses the 
"true self" and the watchful, "enabling" teacher who nurtures the 
child to realize its full creative potential. Education acts 
positively to define and construct that "nature." (Walkerdine, 
1983, p. 86) 
Hence, it would make more sense to shift the discussion from a 
"reactionary/radical seesaw" to an analysis which places power, not simply 
11 
with "the system" which oppresses, or with the children who are to be set 
free, but in contexts in which it is implicated in the very form of theories 
and practices which constitute and fix the natural-normal and its exclusion. 
Meanwhile, there has been an ongoing critique of those practices which 
produce and form the modern "child." We know, for example, that "childhood 
today" is a rather recent phenomenon which emerged out of the practices and 
discourses of the rising middle class in Europe (Ariks, 1962; Demause, 1974; 
Polakow, 1982; Hold, 1974). By naming certain people "children" we 
distinguish them from others as different, other, or special in some way. We 
study the characteristics of childness and determine special actions we must 
take to deal with their specialness. Parallel insights can be found in Michel 
Foucault's M3dness and Civilization (19651, in which the history of mental 
illness and the development of special institutions to serve the needs of the 
merging "illm--who are deemed to have special needs--is traced. Most 
provocatively, this work can inform our interests in children by providing a 
discourse for understanding how their demarcation as special people leads to a 
growing body of knowledge about the limits of what these people are capable of 
doing, and about the dangers they pose. But more importantly, Foucault can 
provide insight into the role this knowledge plays in establishing "normality" 
by delineating the abnormal. That is, our definition of "adult" is defined to 
a great extent in terms of what we ascribe to a child. 
In this sense, the discourse of education can be seen to demarcate what ' 
a child is and is not. Valerie Walkerdine (1988) has taken this approach, 
studying teachers' records, including references to teachers' guides and 
future lesson plans, as well as evaluative comments on individual students. 
Her work reveals fascinating "truths" which are translated through the 
"scientific" codification of these truths as "fact." In a L6vi-Straussian 
manner, she unravels classificatory adult/child references in the ways 
teachers subtextually define dualities of work/play, rote/real learning, 
knowing/understanding, passivity/activity, etc., through their practice. Her 
work points out that we cannot separate action from the discourse that 
describes, proscribes, or prescribes action. 
We might also interpret much of developmental psychology in terms of its 
negative knowledge for educators (specifying what children at certain ages 
cannot do), and the subsequently harmful exercise of power attached to that 
knowledge. (Sarason, 1981). Now, this is not to say that psychology as a 
project should be abandoned; much of the kind of knoweldge it produces can be 
beneficial. But we should be concerned that what initially appears positive 
and empowering may be mostly harmful in the long run. For example, Walden and 
Walkerdine (1982) undertook a study of existing explanations for why girls 
tend not to perform as well as boys in mathematics. They found that 
discussions of the importance of spatial ability and socialization into 
stereotypical sex-roles have more to do with informing the teachers' actions 
than does student performance. At the same time, they found that the way in 
which the students read their own and the teacher's actions was crucial. It 
is generally agreed that spatial ability is fundamental to mathematical 
"skills," particularly in terms of its importance within the Piagetian 
approach, and the more recent Van Hiele approach to mathematics, as the 
development of concepts throug actions on objects. But, despite the teachers' 
skepticism regarding girls' interests or abilities with construction 
materials, there were no differences in interest or types of constructions by 
gender. And, when girls did play with such materials on their own, instead of 
at the request of the two researchers, the teachers often did not notice. 
Walden and Walkerdine also found socialization arguments to be weak. Rather, 
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it was the construction of gender identities in the classroom by the children 
themselves, as one of the ways in which they made sense of what they were 
doing, that seemed most significant. For example, girls tended to switch the 
ongoing discourse into one of domesticity in order to exercise power over boys 
(Walkerdine, 1981). This latter action is particularly ironic, since such a 
facility in discourse would be an indication of mathematical aptitude were 
mathematics defined as a process more akin to language than to the 
internalization of action, as it is quite possible to do (See, e.g., the 
entire issue of Visible Lanuuaue, 1982; Boomer, 1986; Corran and Walkerdine, 
1981). 
At a recent conference, one of the researchers involved in the above 
study (Walkerdine, 1988) posited that one of the important links for 
facilitating the translation from "truth" to "fact" through practice is the 
collection of fantasies, or imagined possibilities, that are embodied in the 
discursive and non-discursive actions of the teacher. This is similar to 
Foucault's (1965) "field of possibilities," which is indicative of power and 
its exercise, and has the potential to help us understand how variant 
productions of "childhood" might be possible. For example, Tice (1981) has 
discussed common perceptions of children as "treasures," "possessions," or 
"the governed." He advocates the construction of a new discourse in which 
children are seen as junior partners in an enterprise, and sets out four 
"natural" conditions of moral rights: an acknowledgment of children's worth 
as human beings, or as individuals in their own right; a concern to facilitate 
their growth and, as an extension of parental love, an independence that will 
enable their fruitfully independent life in society; an acceptance of the 
responsibility for fostering an equal distribution of certain rights among all 
children within society; and a belief that those who can do so are obligated 
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to support efforts to fulfill equal rights for all children everywhere. For 
Tice, rights accorded to "normal" adults--of free speech, of fair and honest 
treatment, of free inquiry, of due process, etc.--emerge as part of the effort 
to fulfill common goals and ideals. Similarly, Cohen (1980) suggests that, 
since our notion of a complete (adult) person includes certain capacities that 
children simply do not have, we could culturally intervene by establishing a 
system of childrens' advocates that provide precisely these capabilities; as 
long as these capacities are provided, there can be no noticeable difference 
between, or treatment of, individuals, regardless of age. Holt (1974), 
however, argues that an articulation of the differences in capacities which 
are relevant to rights, debates merely helps construct our very modern form of 
childhood. He points out that, in fact, there are numerous alternative ways 
in which to categorize people in terms of capacities or abilities that have 
little to do with age, and that for each particular capacity we are likely to 
find a "more appropriate" demarcation than age. Indeed, if we wished, we 
could allow ourselves to be perpetually surprised at instances of very young 
children acting responsibly in ways ordinarily assumed as in accordance with 
rights given only to adults. In the end, Holt finds our adult uses of 
children as people on which to practice the exercise of power, as badges of 
prestige, love objects, etc. to be the more honest justifications for 
reproducing the modern construction of childhood. 
So we might, following Walkerdine and Halt, take the fantasies (and 
fears) behind the discourse very seriously. They cetainly seem significant 
when we think of Foucault's work with "mental illness," and compare the ways 
in which we as educators construct the pathologies of school performance. 
Yet, they become even more frightening when we recognize, as Foucault did 
(1980), that it is through the expansion of the methods of science and 
knoweldge that the individual has become an object of knowledge, both to him 
or her self and others--an object that tells the truth about him or her self 
in order to know him or her self and be known. This "technology of the self" 
requires the belief that one can, through the help of experts, tell the truth 
about oneself: 
The conviction that truth can be discovered through the self- 
examination of consciousness and the confession of one's thoughts 
and acts now appears so natural, so compelling, indeed so self- 
evident, that it seems unreasonable to posit that such self- 
examination is a central component in a strategy of power. 
(Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983, p. 175) 
Thus, even beyond the problematic nature of, say, teachers assessing students, 
as we try to understand both teachers and students as interpreters of meaning- 
-and even more importantly, ourselves as researchers endeavoring to interpret- 
-we must question the implicit authority wielded in the act of interpretation. 
Interpretation and the modern "subject" imply each other. It would be an 
imporant and rewarding task to analyze the growth of interpretive practices 
and to show their relations with and differences from those Foucault has 
discussed (e.g., participant observation). Nonetheless, part of the very 
power of these "sciences" is that they claim to be able to reveal "truths" 
about our psyches, our culture and our society--truths that can only be 
understood by expert interpreters. This can certainly bewilder those 
educators interested in social change. As Foucault concludes at the end of 
his Historv of Sexuality, "The irony of this deployment is in having us 
believe that our liberation is in the balance." 
Thus, recognizing our own reading of "truth" as regulative--at least in 
terms of their role in the formation of policies and practices, it becomes 
imperative that we reflect on our fears and fantasies, and how they impact 
upon the "truth" we speak. This may be just as well, since we determine in 
our own research what we see as normative or pathological, we can only end up 
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as surveillants. The only way I can see to get around this is to incorporate 
collaborative research methodologies in which the "subject" of the research is 
as much a "subject" in the philosophical sense as the researcher. If we can 
be facilitators of people's own reflections on their situational perceptions 
and fantasies, then we might be able to empower them as well as contribute to 
a "body of knowledge." Otherwise, we will at best pat ourselves on the back 
for giving these people a "voice." 
Equally significant at this historical moment is the relevant extension 
of the metaphorical image of childhood produced through the deskilling of 
teachers in the proliferation of pre-packaged curricula and the paternalistic 
management of schools. Here, teachers are considered to lack capacities 
requisite for successful learning to occur. Recent influential reports 
(Holmes Group, 1986; Carnegie Foundation) call for a professionalization of 
teaching. Such proposals devalue regular day-to-day interaction with students 
in favor of theorizing and policy-making distanced from practice. As "good 
teachers" rise in status, they will no longer be teaching, but telling 
teachers what to implement. This is certainly a predictable response to the 
age-ist ideology that ascribes status to a profession according to the age of 
the client (pediatricians get less money and esteem than internists, day-care 
workers less than elem.entary school teachers, "professional" status teachers 
whose clients are other teachers get more than "assistant" teachers, etc.). 
But, as Sara Freedman (1988) has argued, such reports are an attempt, not 
necessarily to improve the status of teaching, but more likely to lurr back 
into teaching middle-class, white women who have in the last few decades found 
it possible to enter male-dominated occupations. As well, demographics 
suggest that the implementation of such programs is most likely to perpetuate 
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gender biases in favor of male master teachers and administratiors and against 
female, "ordinary" teachers (Freedman, 1985; Apple, 1986). 
This link of "teacher as child," lacking professional skills, and 
"teaching as women's work" is crucial, for women have historically been 
grouped with children as the treasures and possessions of men. Much of the 
initial progress in our recognition of gender-demarcated oppression was, in 
fact, accomplished through the reclassification of women as non-children. We 
have much to gain from our experTence in working for equal rights for women, 
especially in the relatively recent realization that equal rights do not mean 
male-ifying women. That is, equality means more than equal opportunities for 
women to do the same things as men. We must continue to find strategies that 
enable women to remain women as well as "equal." Likewise, we must enable 
youth to remain youth as well as people. Yet I want to argue that we have 
retained the most insipid forms of domination in our practices of "child- 
rearing," and that no real progress can be made unless we can reconstruct the 
teacher-student relationship, in combination with and distinct from its age- 
ist cloak. But such a reconstruction can only take place if our power is 
exercised through our actions such that a different "subject" is produced. 
Perpetuation of both dualisms puts our focus on those aspects of teaching 
which are simultaneously learning, and vice-versa, zooming in on conceptual 
constructs that rationalize existing power structures. 
Easier said than done. The literature is rampant with discussions of 
how and why educational institutions work to promote the production of 
traditional relationships. While philosphical and psychological research has 
focused on theory, the sociology and anthropology of education have 
consistently presented us with a picture of schools as, to employ Michael 
Katz' terms (Katz, 1975), particularly good sites of bureaucratic reproduction 
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(Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977; Bowles & Gintis, 1976), complete with rigid 
hierarchies of control and authority. Furthermore, approaches to education 
that incorporate an awareness of resistance to the mechanisms of social, 
cultural, and institutional reproduction (e.g. Apple, 1982; Willis, 1981) tend 
to recycle and reproduce the dualism between individual agency and social 
structure. Consequently, it is difficult for them to develop a theory of 
pedagogy that links structures and institutions to human agency and action in 
a dialectical manner (Aronowitz & Giroux, 1985). Such work has the propensity 
to neglect oppositional behaviors which are produced amidst contradictory 
discourses and values. A given "act" of resistance may be linked to class, 
gender, ethnic or race interests, or it may express repressive moments 
inscribed in such behavior by the dominant culture rather than a message of 
protest. This literature also typically ignores issues of gender and race, 
preferring instead to focus on class and clashing ethnicities. And only 
recently has such research begun to explore less overt acts of resistance 
among students and teachers, following a legacy of romanticizing student 
rebellion that often misconstrued the political value of this resistance. 
That is, it failed to adequately develop.the ways in which the actions of 
teachers and students served to produce the very field of possible ways in 
which such actions "signify" resistance, thereby surrepetitiously confirming 
notions of appropriate conformity. For example, uses of humor and purposely 
igonoring another person have been identified as important actions (McClaren, 
1985; Everhart, 1983). 
I suggest that such shortcomings are due to the fact that theories of 
resistance have not given enough attention to the issue of how domination and 
dominating reaches into the structure of the personality itself. The often 
contradictory relation between action and understanding has not been 
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elaborated very well. But it would be difficult to successfully undertake 
this task without a reasonable sense of the subject, Goran Therborn's (1980) 
use of ideology may be helpful here. What he means by ideology is the 
constitution and patterning of how poeple live their lives as conscious, 
reflecting initiators of acts in a structured, meaningful world (p. 15). He 
suggests that social, cultural and insitutional structues "qualify" people by 
certifying them--implicitly or explicitly--as "qualified" to perform certain 
actions, and by "qualifying". the very actions and ideas that are possible or 
deviant (note the double meaning of "qualify.") And, borrowing a concept from 
Louis Althusser, he proposes that we perceive subjects as "interpellating" 
themselves as acting subjects along two dimensions of "being-in-the-world": 
the subjectivities of "being," and the subjectivities of "in the world." A 
subjectivity of "being" is always existential in that a subject is a 
particular (i.e. gendered) individual at a particular point in his or her life 
cycle, related to other (gendered) individuals of-different generations at 
certain places in their life cycles. Similarly, a subjectivity of being is 
also always historical, since a subject exists in a certain human society at a 
particular moment of human history (e.g., a teacher in a junior high, a 
shaman, a blacksmith, etc.). Subjectivities of "in-the-world" are both 
inclusive, in that a human being is a member of a meaningful world, and 
positional, since a person has a particular place in the world in relation to 
other things and people in the world. What this sort of theorizing allows us 
to do is accept the fact that people "are not unitary subjects uniquely 
positioned but produced as a nexus of subjectivities in relations of power 
which are constantly shifting, rendering them at one moment powerful and at 
another powerless" (Walkerdine, 1981, p. 14). 
This identifies certain contradictions for traditional Marxist and neo- 
Marxist approaches to the relations of power in educational institutions. For 
example, in adapting Therborn's scheme, we can no longer view education as a 
bourgeois institution that places teachers in a position of power from which 
they can oppress children who are institutionally powerless. A teacher, 
powerful in a bourgeois institution, is in a position to oppress those 
children whose resistance to that power--like all resistance--is understood as 
ultimately progressive rather than contradictory. Similar modifications need 
to be made as well as to the discourse of childrens' movements that consider 
resistance in terms of "rights" or "liberation," and feminist accounts that 
use concepts of "role" and "stereotype" to understand women and girls as 
unitary subjects whose economic dependence, powerlessness and physical 
weakness is reflected in their production as "passive," "weak," and 
"dependent" jndividuals (Walkerdine, 1981). These discourses have been 
important in helping to deve'iop emancipatory practices. But the analyses they 
promote may not be as helpful as we might suppose. 
Nevertheless, most literature on schooling reads like a compendium of 
empirical support for Richard Rorty's (1985) attempt to dichotomize people as 
"naturally" falling into one of two ways of approaching the world: 
There are two principal ways in which human beings, by placing 
their lives in a larger context, give sense to those lives. The 
first is by telling the story of their contribution to a 
community ... The second...is to describe themselves as standing in 
immediate relation to a non-human reality ... I shall say that the 
stories of the former kind exemplify the desire for solidarity, 
and that stories of the latter kind exemplofy the desire for 
objectivity. (p. 4) 
For Everhart (1983), the distinction is between the dominant "cognitive 
interests" (Habermas, 1971) of teachers and students. That is, teachers and 
students have different orientations and basic assumptions about what 
constitutes knowledge. These interests serve as basic discriminators between 
types of knowledge, and help to define knowledge and the nature of assumptions 
about the cognitive processes that are part of coming to "know" something. 
Associated with these interests are modes of inquiry, or knowledge systems, 
that establish the procedures by which one comes to "know." Focusing on the 
use to which knowledge is put, we can then identify how what "counts" as 
knowledge affects the type of social activity engaged in as a result of the 
existing knowledge. The emphasis in schools on technical interests and 
reified knowledge, exemplified by Habermas' empirical-analytical mode of 
understanding, leads to instrumental, or purposive-rational action ("...the 
ordering of technical interests to instrumental action is best typified by the 
required action of students to solve dilemmas posed for them in advance by 
teachers, and for the purpose of "succeeding," "passing," "getting by," etc.," 
p. 240). But students create interactional networks reflecting practical 
cognitive interests, in which knowledge grows out of collective interaction, 
rather than preceding it or serving as a base for action, and out of which 
knowledge is generated contextually. 
In contrast, McClaren (1985) uses a ritual approach (based on the work 
of Victor Turner (1967, 1969) to distinguish between the "raw" "streetcorner 
state" and the "cooked" "student state." Outside of school, the individual 
acts out her or his drama of apotheosis, revenge, resistance and 
revitalization in an atmosphere in which time is relatively unstructured or 
polychromatic, and in which the body is in a subjunctive mood. This is a 
liminal or liminoidal dimension with a ludic ethos. In school, the student is 
socialized offstage; body rhythms switch from loping gaits and swaggers, 
accompanied by shouts, to regimented control of movement with associated 
groans, sighs and cynical laughter. It is an indicative mood in which the 
metaphors of the street corner are replaced by a metonymy that helps produce 
predictable, restrictive cultural forms. 
Everhart and McClaren provide fine examples of how far one can go with 
resistance theory, using two seemingly divergent theoretical backgrounds. 
Everhart concludes that student resistance is not emancipatory because the 
discourse established by the generative knowledge of the students does not 
enable critical reflection of their own situation. Interestingly, the 
discourse produced is dependent on the students' class background, thus 
explaining to some degree the mechanisms of social reproduction. McClaren 
uses Turner's ritual theory to point out that, while actions and material 
"things" have fluid, symbolic power, in the case of the street corner and 
student states, there simply is no symbolic carryover from one to the other 
because of the class and ethnic differences between them. 
These writers also do a marvelous job of updating the canonical 
theorization of sociological and anthropological studies of education which 
demarcated the world of the school, its expectations and "hidden curriculum," 
from that of the student and his or her peer group (Waller, 1965; Cusick, 
1972; Jackson, 1968; Larkin, 1979). Quite simply, when we look at schools, we 
see the teachers and administrators with agendas that have nothing whatsoever 
to do with the social agenda that the students bring with them. Jackson tried 
to explain this in terms of crowd theory. The students, grouped daily, get to 
know each other well and are bound by their common experience; because they 
are forced to be in school and concentrate on things that they do not choose 
themselves, the pull to communicate is stronger in the classroom than many 
other crowd situations. Cusick noted the enormous portions of time that 
students spend watching and waiting. By adapting to the role of a spectator, 
they form a complex social and cultural system representative of their 
perspective about their place in school and the meaning derived from it. 
(Wexler's (1987) metaphor of learning as television watching is an apt 
rephrasing of this theory.) The meaning of school for students, which grows 
from the organizational role defined for and by the pupils, makes social 
interaction very important. Larkin observed this phenomenon in terms of 
authority and autonomy, concluding that even attempts by teachers to involve 
students in decisions about school activities were destined to fail becasue to 
participate in such activities was to accept the premise that the school 
fostered events that were worth the student's time in the first place. 
Dialogical philosophy parallels this theorization. For example, Buber 
(1948) makes a distinction between I-It relationships, in which the subject 
treats another person like an object, and I-Thou dialogues, effected when two 
subjects address and respond to each other. Students can be read as "its" 
because they are viewed as part of the world and caught in its causal chain. 
The "I" of a student only appears and is shaped in the I-Thou context of 
immediate peer group (Habermas' generative knowledge). Yet, if either party 
in a potential dialogue treats the other as an it, then both become "its" 
without the I-creating activity of an I-Thou relationship. Hence, we can 
understand that the very nature of a practice founded on pre-theorizing action 
(such as pedagogy) is psychologically harmful to both participants, teacher 
and student. A Buberian approach to education might then be forced to explore 
the sorts of educative structures that would allow for dialogic encounters to 
take place, encounters in which both the teacher and the student were 
genuinely interested in addressing and being addressed by each other--- 
learning networks, computer conferences, etc. 
In the early eighties, Willis (1981) shifted the terrain of discussion 
by layering a neo-Marxist in class and production on top of the 
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teacher/student dichotomy, drawing a distinction between the middle-class 
school and the working-class lads. The separation became manifest in the ways 
that class delineated orientations to a mind/body dualism. For example, the 
lads, already rejecting the intended continuity between work and mental labor 
built into the formalized dimensions of school, were attracted to a world of 
manual labor which permitted the working-class patterns they were most 
accustomed to. Everhart echoes this theme, linking it with a "natural" 
(liberal) desire for self-control: student labor is mostly estranged, and, 
because of this, the pupils attempt to reappropriate relevant portions of 
their lives in school. In this way, rather than others, they have power over 
their lives. The subsequent knowledge is regenerative in nature due to its 
grounding in the context of action and the collective interpretations 
generated by the sharing of similar experiences. Likewise, McClaren speaks of 
class hegemony as "shrouding the body" and "dampening the will" through an 
intricate web of symbols and root paradigms mediated by capitalist relations 
of power and privilege, and of human agency as "always alive," "rupturing the 
unitary pervasiveness of structural, sedimented oppression." But in his 
study, class was overlayed with the issues of ethnicity and religion 
(Portuguese immigrant children versus white middle-class Toronto teachers, 
with contrasting orientations towards Catholicism.) More recently, Ashendon, 
Connell, Dowsett and Kessler (1987) collaborated on research which identified 
two main patterns of hegemony in schools: teachers over kids and different 
groups of students over each other. The correspondence (or lack thereof) 
between these two patterns had a great deal to do with the way a particular 
school functioned, and the way teachers did and experienced their work. (For 
example, the private school full of "ruling-class" kids differed significantly 
from the working class public schools studied.) Deem (1978) had linked class 
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with gender, emphasizing that the structural organization of capitalist 
societies leads to a division of labor and resulting personal and 
psychological traits assumed natural to men and women. The particular gender 
division of labor may not be inevitable, nor does education necessarily create 
a sexual division of labor. But, in the present organization of capitalism, 
the divisionis central to the-reproduction of the work force, and education 
rarely does anything to undermine the process. 
The result of this work has been a grasping at additional dimensions-- 
class, race, ethinicity, gender, etc.--which, as Philip Wexler (1983, 1987) 
has reluctantly whined, ends up virtually indistinguishable from the old- 
fashioned variable-identifying sociology of education it was striving to 
subsume. The image is of Ptolemysts, furiously defending anthropocentrism by 
accumulating ever-more-subtle epicycles, like. squirrels gathering nuts for the 
winter. But these dimensions & appear important, especially as they 
intersect with the ways in which teaching and schooling forces technical 
interests (Everhart, Ashendon, & d.), and the ways in which the "schooling 
culture" is made and remade continually through the dynamics of ritual 
(McClaren; also Giddens, 1984) without revealing the source of its 
legitimating power. Teachers need to develop "variety-reducing outlooks" in 
order to deal with large numers of students and, to the extent that teachers 
come to view the schooling of studnets through the assumptions of simple, 
reified schemes of knowledge, the ideology of teachers regarding students 
reflects a materialist-based cultural form (Everhart, p. 253). Likewise, 
schooling is founded on providing a standardized array of experiences 
predetermined for students who are conceptualized in a predefined manner 
(Everhart, p. 255). Hence, teachers become great categorizers (Ashendon, g_t 
&.) because their labeling and streaming of students combines with thinking 
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in binary oppositions and with a heavy use of talk as an "autonomic tuning 
device" (McClaren). This enables the school to be a hegemonic system both at 
the level of schools as distributors of knowledge controlled by the capitalist 
state (Bowles & Gintis, 1976; Spring, 1972; Apple, 1979) and, at the level of 
human agency, through our "styles" of engaging the world and the ways in which 
we ritualize our daily lives--gestural embodiments, rhythmic practices, and 
lived forms of resistance (McClaren, 1985; Giddens, 1984). 
However, the trick to dealing with these seemingly endless dimensions 
for determining the location of individuals and their actions is to reverse 
the line of determination, thus dissolvinga the individual/society dichotomy 
and allowing the recognition of the individual as a social construction. The 
new Copernicans of social analysis find conceptual strength in their 
willingness to abandon a personal centrality in favor of relational forces, a 
de-centering "physics" of power. Teachers, for example, shold not be seen as 
instruments of the middle-class versus the working-class, new petit-bourgeois 
versus proletarians, Canadians versus Portuguese immigrants, etc. They 
themselves often come from the same community as their students (Everhart, 
Ashendon, .&. d.). And relationships identified as elucidating class, 
gender, sexual politics, ethnic relationships, etc. are often interwoven with 
each other. Moreover, teaching is contradictory in itself; it is in some ways 
like a (middle-class) profession, in others like a skilled trade 
(unionization, wage labor); it is work within a bureaucracy (career structure, 
tenure, job definitions) but not like a bureaucracy (typically unsupervised 
daily work). We must not work out the "location" of teachers and deduce their 
potential for the exercise of power from this location. Such a 
geometrical/geographical image, belonging to a categorical mode of thought, 
neglects the complexity of the "place" teachers occupy, and forgets that the 
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"place" does not stand still, thus obliterating what teachers actually do. 
"Teachers don't occupy a location; they act in a situation" (Ashendon, d., 
p. 256). 
Ashendon and his colleagues make this point well with "class." Instead 
of asking "in which class location are teachers?" they suggest "into which 
class relations do teachers enter? How far are these relations being formed 
by the person's activity?" Walkerdine (1981) gives us an excellent exmaple of 
how such questions would work when dealing d'irectly with gender and power. 
Her analysis of interchanges between a nursery school teacher and childre who 
are making constructions from leg0 reveals that, although the teacher has an 
institutional she is not uniquely a teacher; nor are the boys 
small boys. By focusing on discourse as action and signification, she is able 
to demonstrate the strength of Therborn's approach to the individual and to 
confirm the lack of any one "most fundamental" ground: 
The particular individuals are produced as subjects within a 
variety of discursive practices. A particular individual has the 
potential to be "read" within a variety of discourses. We cannot 
say that the limit of the variety is determined in any direct or 
simple case by the economic. However, the "materiality" of the 
individual does have particular effects, though those effects are 
not solely determined by that materiality, but by the discourse in 
which it is "read." (Walkerdine, 1981, p. 15) 
Because of who we are, and the way in which relations of power are produced 
\ 
through our actions, only certain discourses are available to us, either 
because of the way in which we read others' actions or because of the ways in 
which our own actions are read by others. This is the fundamental importance 
of Therborn's dimensions of "being" and "in the world" as constraining forces 
in the construction of power. 
In Walkerdine's case, the teacher is a women, and while that itself is 
crucial, it is only because of the ways in which "woman" signifies that we can 
understand the specific nature of the event. The boys resist her both by 
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asserting their difference from her and by seizing power through constituting 
her as the powerless object of sexist discourse. Their power is gained by 
refusing to be the powerless objects of her discourse and recasting her as the 
powerless object of theirs. She has not ceased to be a teacher; but what is 
important is that she no longer "signifies" as one. She is now a "woman-as- 
sex-object." 
Of course, both the boys and the teacher have the potential to be 
produced as subjects or objects. But inherent in the discursive positionings 
are different positions of power: 
Individuals, constituted as subjects and objects within a 
particular framework, are produced by that process into relations 
of power. An individual can become powerful or powerless 
depending on the terms in which her or his subjectivity is 
constituted. (p. 16) 
To reiterate, the material and economic are not unique or linear causes of the 
productive power relations in Walkerdine's example, although gender and age 
have important effects. Since the boys are both children and male, and the 
teacher is both teacher and female, they can enter as subjects into specific 
variety of discourses, some of which are empowering, others not. When the 
boys call a female student a "cunt," they immediately "bring the teacher down 
to size;" she and the small girl are the same thing in discourse. Meanwhile, 
the teacher "reads" the childrens' actions as a harmless expression of a 
sexuality both normal and natural. "It was not by accident that she waited so 
long to stop the boys, nor that she did so with a gentle rebuke which did not 
take issue with the content of their talk." (p. 17) Her actions are 
pedagogical practices that aim to produce individuals who are controlled but 
not regimeted. The purpose of such a pedagogy is to produce "better" 
(rational) control through self-control; ironically, this is precisely what 
helps to open the space for the practice of the children to be powerful. 
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The production of rational, self-choosing individuals comes from 
psychoanalytic theories that assume such an individual will develop if left 
alone and that sexuality and aggression will otherwise be pushed down to 
fester in the unconscious (Walkerdine, p. 19). This pedagogy expects to 
produce agents responsible for their own actions and whose interactions are 
based on rationality alone, leaving behind the irrational. Education 
following these goals serves to produce unitary subjects making logical, 
rational choices. But Walkerdine's illustration points out that the rational 
ideal is doomed to failure, both in asserting rationality and in picturing a 
unitary subject. The very discourse which aims to "set children free" from 
over-regulation permits any activity as a "natural" expression of "something." 
We might go so far as to say that children in such classrooms cannot be 
understood as produced in discourses which have oppressive effects; they 
simply have experiences which are transparent in incidental contexts. 
Marshall Sahlins (1985) describes this interaction of social structure 
and human agency by emphasizing the degree to which actions throw open the 
field of possible transformation or reproduction. Like Sahlins' Hawaiian 
natives and European pirates, the children and the teacher in Walkerdine's 
classroom, left to their own devices, act so as to reproduce those positions 
in those discourses with which they are familiar. Yet the constellation of 
their very efforts at reproduction is simultaneously an important 
transformation in the social structures of power. The individuals in 
Walkerdine's example are not just produced in static, unitary reflections of 
social forces; nor are they given power as a function of their institutional 
position. The discursive forces which shape the pedagogy of the classroom 
produce a space that promotes the childrens' power and also asserts the 
naturalness and harmlessness of their actions. The contradictions are 
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produced by the way in which the "material" of the individual provides the 
potential to be the subject U object of a variety of discourses and 
accompanying practices. Note that this interpretation avoids both the 
unitary, rational subject, as well as the individual as a "real," essential 
kernel whose outer skins are a multiplicity of roles that can be shed to 
reveal the true, revolutionary self. 
Teachers feel guilty about oppressing children. But this is not the 
whole story. Nor can we expect liberal pedagogy to free children to explore 
their own experience without understanding precisely how that experience is 
understood and how that understanding produces the children as subjects. "The 
next task" is to formulate a post-liberal education which, in the words of 
C.A. Bowers (1987), "decenters individualism" by embracing "the nature of 
embeddeness and tradition." This is of course quite a challenge. As Bowers 
has demonstrated, the hegemony of liberal discourse is very strong, 
encompassing virtually all twentieth-century models of pedagogy, ranging from 
John Dewey to Paulo Friere and Carl Rogers, on the one hand, and B.F. Skinner, 
on the other. 
But, as long as we're blasting dichotomies, we should mention Wexler's 
(1987) concern that we avoid the traditional split of theory and practice in 
favor of supporting larger educative social movements. Critical social 
analyses of schooling have until now ignored important ways in which schools 
interact with the public sphere (e.g., the educative aspects of the media) and 
generally fail to articulate a contextual, institutional, educational 
politics: 
... classifying and romanticizing cultural emanations as 
"resistances" was a diversion from asking what contemporary forms 
might replace the clubs, societies, and coffee-houses that once 
served as the public social places and occasions for educations. 
(Wexler, 1987, p. 182) 
The danger is that a critical pedagogy, as currently 
coneptualized, may be appropriating the place and voice of 
existing, practically-inspired educational movements as well as 
more informal critical education discourse within far broader 
social movements. (U., p. 227) 
The presence of these movements--Wexler mentions French feminism, life history 
studies, New York graffitti gangs--belies that a critical pedagogy could be 
theorized in the academy and successfully handed down to the classroom with 
more than token effect. In the end, people focusing on schools replace 
politics by ignoring these popular movements. 
Weiler (1988) bypasses such an interjection by investigating precisely 
the interaction of educational institutions and the women's movement. 
Following Bakhtin's (1981) social construction of voice, she focuses on how 
the actions of feminist teachers and adminsitrators open up opportunities for 
an emerging discourse of gender and power, and how the discourse of 
contemporary feminism helps them reflect on how their own actions tructure the 
actions of both themselves and their students. 
Likewise, Bowers (1987) explores the possibilities for using education 
to work within the larger educative movement of bioregionalism. Indeed, 
bioregional issues should be of particular interest for future exploration of 
the concerns of this paper because of the direct denial of the persistent 
nature/culture dualism. As discourse, bioregionalism also builds upon those 
uses of children's rights arguments intended to support a unified view of the 
rights status of all human beings (Allen 19801, expanding the discourse to 
include the moral rights of all things, living and non-living, for all 
contribute to the existence of life. 
Modern interpretations of alienation and empowerment have so far 
obscured the importance of place or biological context, preferring an 
unrealistic anthropocentrism. In contrast, bioregionalists conceive of the 
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individual and his or her place as integral to each other. The discourse of 
bioregionalism replaces the fundamental binary separation, in which an 
abstract deity disrupts the experience of the sacred as a form of geography 
organizing space, into the binary logic of humanity and God, which has led to 
our estrangement from the environment. By emphasizing the interdependence of 
place and person, or nature and culture, a bioregional pedagogy offers 
possible links between empowerment and a culture in ecological balance. In 
dissolving this more insipid dichotomy, we have shifted from Ursula LeGuin's 
fictional account of freedom, autonomy and individuality in The Dispossessed 
to her more recent Alwavs Cominu Home, which focuses on the abandonment of the 
myth of purposive-rationality as a source of power and the maintenance of a 
subsistance culture attuned to the rhythms of the environment. 
One example of the production of subjectivity and power that cuts 
through gender, biology and both the individual/society and nature/culture 
dichotomies is offered by Henriques & d. (1984, pp. 21-2). Hundreds of 
girls in Puerto Rico have started to experience an accelerated sexual 
maturation from the age of six months; indeed, some four-year-olds show full 
breast development and menstruation. It is hypothesized that this is due to 
estrogen in chicken feed since chicken is the staple diet of many Americanized 
Puerto Ricans. The biological changes, which place the children in the limbo 
of "child/woman" have caused serious confusion. Yet, these changes have not 
unilaterally altered the childrens' view of themselves or their social 
relations: it is because of the ways that adult women's sexuality signifies 
that the effects are as they are. Not denying the very real effects of the 
estrogen (politically or theoretically), the "problem" is both biological and 
social. Moreover, the changes are possibly reversable with a chicken-free , 
diet. But the call for such a change is resisted by the corporations that 
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control Puerto Rican agribusiness, which introduce economic and political 
concerns. Henriques &. suggest reconceptualizing "nature" and "culture" 
in such a way that the implicit dualism is dissolved in favor of a stress on 
the relational character of their mutual effects. 
What the above example illustrates is that many of our dilemmas are 
productions of a dualistic discourse that promotes the acceptance of 
assumptions about the "normal" and "natural" as "fact." An individual/society 
dualism maintains an erroneous distinction between a unitary subject and 
social structure, thus producing the unitary subject. This subject is 
embodied in a discourse which does not recognize power as an important 
conceptual tool. Yet a deconstruction of the unitary subject leads to the 
necessity of power-perspectives in the production of subjectivities. As 
Alasdair MacIntyre (1984) has noted, rational thought emanating from such an 
individual gives the appearance of elevating moral decision-making but 
actually serves to strengthen a cultural tendency toward the emotivism of 
"subjective judgment." The relativism that characterizes this discourse makes 
a central problem out of how to reconcile individual self-direction with the 
more complex demands associated with membership in a community (Bowers, 1987). 
Likewise, the nature/culture dualism makes a fundamental dilemma out of how to 
reconcile individual (or cultural) self-direction with the more complex 
demands associated with immersion in a bioregion. 
In any form, these entrenched dualism are expressions of what Sahlins 
(1985, p. 154) calls "the twin anthropological (or historical) errors" of 
materialism and idealism. "They consist in attempts to link the meaningful 
significance and the worldly happening in some mechanical or physicalist 
relation of cause and effect." For materialism, the significance is the 
direct effect'of the objective properties of the happening. This ignores the 
relative value or meaning given to the happening by society. For idealism, 
the happening is merely an effect of its significance which ignores the burden 
of "realityw--the forces that have real effects, if always in terms of some 
cultural scheme. The same goes for theory and practice (untrue in practice, 
absurd as theory; all praxis is theoretical, etc.), the individual and the 
collective, the real and the ideological, and so on. "Culture functions as a 
synthesis of stability and change, past and present, diachrony and synchrony." 
(p. 144) Schools are sites of action within more global contexts: the 
interaction of varying an conflicting productions of subjectivities that 
"happens" in these "places" can help us understand how action works to 
structure power and how the exercise of power structures action. In what ways 
do "teachers" and "students" negotiate the structuration in their classroom? 
How does this reproduce transform the culture of the classroom? How do 
"knowledge" and "learning" differ acrdss varying structurations of power and 
how do the socially-constructed definitions of knowledge and learning 
contribute to this structuration of power? The "symbolic" dialogue of history 
implict in these questions--a dialogue between the received categories and the 
perceived contexts, between cultural sense and practical reference--crumbles 
"a whole series of ossified oppositions by which we habitually understand both 
history and the cultural order." (p. 145) Here we begin to fight the 
typically "ameliorist" stance of eduation theory (Kliebard, 1975) by embracing 
"the risk of cultural action" (Sahlins, p. 149): 
Action is a risk of categories in reference. In action, people 
put their concepts and categories into ostensible relations to the 
world. Such referential uses bring into play other determinations 
of the signs, besides their received sense, namely the actual 
world and the people concerned. Praxis is, then, a risk to the 
sense of signs in the culture-as-constituted, precisely as the 
sense is arbitrary in its capacity as reference. ... The gamble is 
that referential action, by placing g priori concepts in 
correspondence with external objects, will imply some unforseen 
effects that cannot be ignored ... The 'objective' gamble lies in 
the disproportions between words and things ... The 'subjective' 
risk consists in the possible revisions of signs by acting 
subjects in their personal projects. (Sahlins, pp. 149-50) 
... The truer issue lies in the dialogue of sense and reference, 
inasmuch as reference puts the system at the risk of other 
systems: the intelligent subject in the intransigent world. And 
the truth of this larger dialogue consists of the indissoluble 
synthesis of such as past and present, system and event, structure 
and history. (p. 156) ' 
Thus, despite his faith in the purposive reorganization of experience 
leading to an escalator of social improvement founded on the scientific 
method, Dewey (1916) indubitably hit the mark. Social ruptures of continuity 
have their intellectual formulation in various dualisms such as labor/leisure, 
practical/intellectual activity, humanity/nature, individuality/association, 
and culture/vocation which have their counterparts in traditional dualism of 
classical philosophical systems, such as mind/matter, body/mind, mind/world, 
individual/social relationships. Underlying these various separations are 
fundamental assumptions about the isolation of mind from activity involving 
physical conditions, bodily organs, material appliances, and natural objects. 
Consequently, there is an indicated philosophy which recognizes the origin, 
place and function of mind in an activity which controls the environment. (p. 
323) This is the power of individual subjectivity to produce a unitary 
subject. Where he went astray was to assume that this was a consistent, 
\ 
circular argument that implied an investigation of the biological continuity 
of human impulses and instincts with natural energies, etc. In the end, he 
"recycled and reproduced" the implicit dualism. The question is, can & avoid 
doing so? 
I think we can, if we accept the premise that Therborn's contraining 
dimensions of "interpellation" do not locate individuals in predictable, pre- 
defined ways. This is the stuff of power: if action were not a gamble, then 
power would be reduced to manipulation. Power is exercised only over "free" 
36 
subjects and only insofar as they are free. It is always a way of action upon 
acting subjects by virtue of their own potential or actual actions--a 
structuration of power. This is the subjectivity of power. 
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